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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The following parties appeared in the proceeding in the 
District Court: 
1. The State of Utah, Plaintiff, represented by the Cache 
County Attorney's Office, Gary McKean and by Assistant Attorney 
General Joanne Slotnik. 
2. Defendant Jack D. Brocksmith. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
Case No. 930146-CA 
First District Court 
> No. 921000051 
) Priority No. 2 
APPELLANT JACK BROCKSMITH?S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to §§ 78-2(a)-l et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, and Article VIII 
§ 1 et seq of the Utah Constitution. Defendant/Appellant entered 
a plea of guilty to six counts of communications fraud on January 
14, 1993. Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea 
on or about February 8, 1993, which motion was denied by the 
Court on or about March 9, 1993 and March 24, 1993. (See 
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 attached hereto.) Notice of appeal was 
mailed pro se on or about March 4, 1993. (See Exhibit 4 attached 
hereto.) 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the District Court's denial of 
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Plea in the First Judicial 
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah, on March 9 and 
March 24, 1993. Defendant/Appellant is hereafter referred to as 
Brocksmith. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Appellant 
to withdraw his plea of guilty to charges entered just days 
previously, after the State had violated § 77-29-5 et sea, Utah 
Code Ann.. after the State had violated Defendant!s rights to a 
speedy trial, after the State had denied access to the courts by 
the Defendant, and after the State had violated numerous rules 
and laws amounting to a denial of equal protection of the laws 
and due process under both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Background and Statement of Facts. 
1. On January 9, 1989, Detective Jim Williamson of the 
Logan City Police Department appeared before the Honorable Clint 
Judkins, Judge of the Circuit Court in the First Judicial 
District for Cache County, Utah, and swore to an affidavit, 
requesting a search warrant and a warrant of arrest for the 
Defendant. A search was conducted on January 9, 1989, and a 
return made on January 12, 1989. (See Record, pp. 215 and 622.) 
2. On June 28, 1989, an arrest warrant was issued by the 
Fourteenth Circuit Court of Mercer County, Illinois, on felony 
charges for the Defendant (Case No. 89-CF-54), charging theft. 
(Referred on Record, p. 53.) 
3. Defendant Brocksmith was arrested in Utah on July 11, 
1989, with a petition for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for 
Defendant as a fugitive from justice pursuant to the Illinois 
warrant of arrest being filed on July 13, 1989, together with an 
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accompanying affidavit in the Cache County Circuit Court case 
(No. 891000741) in the First Circuit Court in and for Cache 
County, Utah. 
4. On July 13, 1989, a warrant of commitment pending the 
issuance of a governor's warrant was issued in the First Judicial 
Circuit Court and on July 17, 1989, a commitment was issued by 
the First Circuit Court commanding any peace officer to take the 
Defendant into custody and to hold him pending an order of 
release or the posting of bail in the amount of $200,000.00. 
5. The Defendant was incarcerated in the Cache County Jail 
pursuant to the Illinois warrant of arrest on July 11, 1989, and 
was held thereafter until October 5, 1989, pursuant to the 
warrant of commitment pending governor's warrant and the 
commitment issued by the First Circuit Court. On October 5, 
1989, the State of Utah filed an information and an affidavit of 
probable cause against the Defendant in Circuit Court Case No. 
892001140 in the First Circuit Court for Cache County, charging 
eight counts of communications fraud as second degree felonies, 
ten counts of theft by deception as second degree felonies, and 
one count of theft by deception as a third degree felony. (See 
Record, p. 216 and referenced p. 165.) 
6. On October 10, 1989, the Defendant appeared in the 
Circuit Court with his attorney, Donald C. Hughes, Jr., and 
waived preliminary hearing. (See Record, p. 216.) On October 
11, 1989, the Defendant was bound over for trial in the District 
Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Utah in and 
for the County of Cache. (See Record, referenced pp. 165 and 216.) 
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7. On October 19, 1989, Mr. Brocksmith appeared in District 
Court with his attorney and entered a plea of not guilty and 
demanded a jury trial. The Defendant did not waive his right to 
a speedy trial nor his right to have a trial within 30 days as 
provided by § 77-1-6(1)(h) Utah Code Ann. (1953), with Defendant 
remaining incarcerated because of inability of post bail. (See 
Record, p. 216 and referenced p. 165.) 
8. The State of Utah claims that on October 25, 1989, a 
motion to dismiss the information was mailed to the Defendant's 
attorney, Donald C. Hughes, Jr., although Mr. Hughes by affidavit 
denies receiving a copy of the motion to dismiss. (See Record, 
p. 512.) 
9. The District Court file contains a letter from 
Brocksmith to the Honorable Gordon Low, Judge of the District 
Court, dated October 31, 1989, in the form of a mailgram. In the 
mailgram Defendant stated that he was unable to reach his 
attorney, did not know the status of his case, and asked: "Where 
is my right to a speedy trial?" The prosecutor did not receive a 
copy of the mailgram. (See Record, p. 305.) 
10. For reasons that do not appear in the record, and in 
the absence of the Defendant and his attorney, the District Court 
signed an order dismissing the information without prejudice, but 
did not give any reason for the dismissal in its order contrary 
to the provisions of § 77-2-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953), and Rule 
25(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. (See Record, p. 
306.) The ex parte order dismissed Case No. 891000111 and on the 
same date the Defendant was transferred to the State of Illinois 
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Illinois for prosecution on state and federal charges. Defendant 
has testified (see Record, p. 513) that he was not informed of 
the State's motion to dismiss by his attorney or directly by the 
State of Utah. 
11. Defendant Brocksmith's mailgram requesting a speedy 
trial was not filed until November 8, 1989, and the Court took no 
action on his request for reconsideration of the Court's order. 
12. On December 21, 1989, the State of Utah filed virtually 
identical charges which it had moved to dismiss just six weeks 
earlier, based upon an affidavit of probable cause for 
information. (See Record, p. 187-208.) The State did not send a 
copy of the newly filed information to the Defendant, although it 
did send a copy to Attorney Donald C. Hughes, Jr. and Attorney 
Robert Gutke. At no time did the State of Utah notify the 
District Court that it was refiling the charges in the Logan 
Circuit Court (No. 891001462). That new information charged four 
counts of communications fraud as first degree felonies, ten 
counts of theft by deception as second degree felonies, and one 
count of theft by deception, a third degree felony. 
13. On February 7, 1990, the Defendant requested 
disposition of the charges against him in Utah pursuant to the 
Interstate Detainer Act to which Utah is a party under the 
provisions of § 77-29-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953). (See Record, p. 
396.) The application for disposition was filed in the District 
Court of Cache County on March 1, 1990, and a copy of which was 
received by the Cache County Attorney. (See Record, pp. 181, 182 
and 397.) The application was prompted by notice from the chief 
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jailer in Mercer County, Illinois, that new charges had been 
filed against him by the State of Utah. The Cache County 
Attorney's Office acknowledges receipt of the application for 
disposition on March 12, 1990. 
14. Without notice to the Defendant, the Cache County 
Attorney appeared before the District Court of the First Judicial 
District on March 26, 1990, but did not inform the District Court 
that virtually identical charges which had been previously 
dismissed by the District Court had been refiled in the Circuit 
Court. Failure by the County Attorney to notify the District 
Court of the true nature of pending charges precluded the 
District Court from filing Brocksmith's application for 
disposition under IAD with the Circuit Court. Instead, the 
County Attorney asked the District Court to not modify its order 
of dismissal of November 6, 1989, which had dismissed the 
previous charges. The minute entry in the District Court 
originally stated that the cases are to remain the same— 
"dismissed ... until charges in Illinois are determined." No 
formal order was prepared and no notice was given to the 
Defendant. On April 2, 1990, Assistant Utah Attorney General 
C.C. Horton II wrote a letter to the Mercer County Sheriff and 
stated that: "... Mr. Brocksmith's request is premature at this 
point." (See Record, pp. 179 and 394-95.) 
15. On April 3, 1990, Ron E. Miller, Special Agent for the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, sent a certified felony warrant 
of arrest and a letter to the Mercer County Sheriff which 
requested that Mercer County "... hold Brocksmith for Utah 
-6-
authorities when Illinois state and federal criminal proceedings 
are finished." (See Record, p. 519.) 
16. On June 5, 1990, the Defendant sent his first of three 
requests for a public defender to the First Judicial Circuit 
Court in Case No. 891001462. This request was filed in the 
Circuit Court where charges were then pending. No action was 
taken on the request. (See Record, p. 183.) 
17. On July 25, 1990, the charges in Illinois were 
determined and the Defendant was sentenced and given credit for 
the time previously served. Even though the 180-day period 
mandated by § 77-29 et seq. Utah Code Ann. would expire on 
September 1, 1990, the State of Utah took no action to have the 
Defendant brought to Utah for trial. Defendant was released from 
the Mercer County Jail on July 31, 1990, into the custody of 
federal authorities. 
18. On August 2, 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office 
sent a certified copy of a felony warrant of arrest and a letter 
to James Fyke, United States Marshal in Springfield, Illinois, 
which requested that "... you hold Brocksmith for Utah 
authorities when Illinois federal criminal proceedings are 
finished." (See Record, pp. 166 and 399.) This letter was 
received by the federal marshal on August 10, 1990. 
19. On August 9, 1990, Defendant was released from federal 
custody on an appearance bond and was free on bond until January 
31, 1991, the date Defendant was convicted of federal mail fraud 
charges. 
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20. On March 16, 1991, the Defendant, acting pro se, filed 
a motion to dismiss all charges in the District Court of the 
First Judicial District. (See Record, referenced p. 165.) The 
District Court took no action on the Defendant's motion, nor did 
the District Court inform the Defendant that charges were pending 
in the Circuit Court and that his motion should be filed with 
that Court. On that same date, the Defendant made his second 
written request for the assistance of counsel. (See Record, 
referenced p. 165.) Defendant requested counsel to assist him 
with his motion to dismiss. Defendant's motion was never 
entertained by the Court as the Court was under the erroneous 
impression that no charges were then pending against the 
Defendant because the County Attorney had failed to notify the 
District Court of the pending charges in Circuit Court. 
21. On April 23, 1991, the Defendant requested a decision 
on his motion and on April 30, 1991, Defendant again requested 
that counsel be appointed because of his indigent status. No 
action was taken on the Defendant's requests. The letter sent by 
Mr. Brocksmith also represents three phone calls to the District 
Court inquiring as to the disposition of his motion to dismiss. 
Even though the Cache County Attorney received a copy of the 
motion to dismiss, no response was forthcoming from either the 
Court or the County Attorney. Having been unable to obtain 
counsel or a hearing on his request for speedy trial in the State 
Courts, Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division. That 
request was denied because the Federal Court, relying on the 
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March 26, 1990 minute entry filed in the Cache County District 
Court, found that no charges were pending against the Defendant 
in the State of Utah. (See Record, referenced p. 165.) Because 
the County Attorney failed to notify the Federal District Court 
of the pending Circuit Court charges, the Federal Court found 
that Defendant had not exhausted his state remedies. 
22. The Defendant appealed the denial of the habeas action 
but later withdrew the appeal as he was under the impression that 
charges against him had, in fact, been dismissed. 
23. On May 13, 1991, Defendant was sentenced on federal 
charges and incarcerated temporarily in the Chicago Metro 
Correction Center. On June 4, 1991, Defendant was permanently 
incarcerated at the Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution in 
Sandstone, Minnesota. 
24. On June 26, 1991, the Cache County Attorney lodged a 
third detainer against the Defendant, under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers Act, with the Sandstone Federal 
Correctional Institution, Sandstone, Minnesota. 
25. On June 27, 1991, the State of Utah filed a request for 
temporary custody of the Defendant. The request for temporary 
custody was not approved, recorded and transmitted by the Circuit 
Court Judge having jurisdiction over the information which formed 
the basis for the detainer lodged against the Defendant, as 
required by Article IV, subsection (a) of the Interstate 
Agreement. (See Record, p. 330.) 
26. Defendant requested and was given 30 days in which to 
challenge his transfer to Utah based upon violation of his rights 
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under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. That 30-day waiting 
period expired on August 24, 1991. On July 3, 1991, Defendant 
sent a third written request for counsel to the First Judicial 
District Court. (See Record, referenced p. 165.) The request 
was mailed to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Cache 
County Attorney. Defendant received no response from this 
request. 
27. On July 7, 1991, Defendant wrote to the Cache County 
Attorney and indicated that he was contesting his transfer to 
Utah as being a violation of his rights under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers. (See Record, p. 332.) Defendant did not 
renew his request for final disposition of the Utah charges after 
he was incarcerated at the Sandstone Federal Correctional 
Institute, under the belief that his previous request, even if it 
had been premature, was triggered upon his permanent placement. 
28. On August 26, 1991, federal authorities at Sandstone 
offered to deliver temporary custody of the Defendant to Utah 
authorities (see Record, p. 173) and on February 20, 1992, the 
Defendant was brought before the Logan Circuit Court. For the 
first time since he had initially requested counsel on April 30, 
1991, he was appointed counsel to defend him. This was 
approximately 176 days following the federal authorities1 offer 
of temporary custody. 
29. On February 24, 1992, the Defendant, through his court-
appointed counsel, filed a motion to dismiss based upon violation 
of Defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial, as well as 
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violation of the terms and provisions of the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers. (See Record, p. 105.) 
30. On March 17, 1992, the State filed a motion to quash 
the Defendant's motion to dismiss, alleging that magistrates in a 
felony case do not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to 
dismiss for violation of speedy trial. On April 2, 1992, the 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins, acting as a magistrate, entered an 
order granting the State's motion and quashing the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss. (See Record, p. 31.) 
31. On April 27, 1992, a preliminary hearing was conducted 
before the Honorable Burton H. Harris, acting as magistrate, and 
the Defendant was bound over to the District Court on one first 
degree felony count of communications fraud, three second degree 
felony counts of communications fraud, ten second degree felony 
counts of theft by deception, and one third degree felony count 
of theft by deception. 
32. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in District Court 
on May 1, 1992. Defendant was arraigned on May 11, 1992. On 
August 19, 1992, the Defendant filed a motion for declaration of 
invalidity, based upon the State's failure to obtain court 
approval prior to transferring the Defendant to the State of 
Utah. (See Record, p. 428.) The Court consolidated the motions 
and a hearing was held thereon on September 24, 1992. On October 
5, 1992, the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and his 
motion for declaration of invalidity. (See Record, pp. 568 and 
591. ) 
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33. Defendant pled guilty to six counts of communications 
fraud on January 14, 1993, and thereafter filed a motion to 
withdraw plea, which motion was denied, and this appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT 
BROCKSMITH TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY INASMUCH 
AS THE STATE HAD VIOLATED THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT 
ON DETAINERS. 
A. The State Violated the 180-Day Trial Limit. 
Utah is a party to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
(IAD) as adopted by U.C.A. § 77-29-1 et. seq. (1953). Article 
III of the (IAD) allows an imprisoned individual, against whom a 
detainer has been lodged, to make a request for final disposition 
of all charges pending in another state by placing a written 
demand with the official having custody of him or her: 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a 
term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional 
institution of a party state, and whenever during 
the continuation of the term of the imprisonment 
there is pending in any other party state any 
untried indictment, information or complaint on 
the basis of which a detainer has been lodged 
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be 
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the 
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and his request for final disposition 
to be made of the indictment, information or 
complaint; (See U.C.A. § 77-29-5.) 
Article III specifies that the demand for final notice be 
given to the official having custody of the prisoner: 
(b) Written notice and request for final 
disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof 
shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the 
warden, commissioner or corrections or other 
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official having custody of him, who shall promptly 
forward it together with the certificate of the 
appropriate prosecuting official and court by 
registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested. 
Significantly, the statue further requires that: 
(d) Any request for final disposition made 
by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof 
shall operate as a request for final disposition 
of all untried indictments, informations or 
complaints on the basis of which detainers have 
been lodged against the prisoner from the state to 
whose prosecuting official the request for 
disposition is specifically directed. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, "any request for final disposition" that a 
prisoner makes should be treated as a demand on the receiving 
state to comply with the terms of IAD. Indeed, the legislature 
has placed only this IAD burden on the prisoner, that is, to send 
a request for disposition. His sending of that request shifts 
the burden to the prison officials who have custody over him to 
prepare and send the forms to the receiving state. See Henaqer 
vs. State, 716 P.2d 669, 673 (Okla. Cr. 1986). 
Defendant filed his original request for final disposition 
on February 7, 1990 with the Mercer County Sheriff who had 
custody over him. His request waived extradition and indicated 
his understanding that the sheriff was to send his request with 
the terms of his incarceration to prosecuting officials in Utah. 
Thus, Defendant's request itself complied with the notice 
requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. As noted 
by the court in Gibson v. Klevenhaqen, 777 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 
1985), the Court may be hard-pressed to conceive of a way in 
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which Defendant Brocksmith, acting as his own counsel, could have 
effected any better compliance with IAD. Id. at 1058. Defendant 
Brocksmith had no duty following his sending of his February 7, 
1990 request for final disposition. His letter was a request for 
disposition. See Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878 (3rd Cir. 1984), 
affirmed, in part, Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct. 
3401, 87 L.#d.2d 516 (1985). 
But Defendant did more than file his original request for 
disposition. He also filed, on March 15, 1991, a motion to 
dismiss the charges pending against him in Utah. This motion was 
filed in the First District Court in Cache County, Utah, and 
operated as his second request for final disposition of the Utah 
charges. in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.C. 1834, 
56 L.Ed. 2ci 329 (1978), the United States Supreme Court found that 
a defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which did not even mention the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, was sufficient to put the 
state on notice of defendant's claim under IAD: 
The record shows that from the time he was 
arrested [the defendant] persistently requested 
that he be given a speedy trial. After his trial 
date had been continued for the third time, he 
sought the dismissal of his indictment on the 
ground that the delay in bringing him to trial 
while the detainer remained lodged against him was 
causing him to be denied certain privileges at the 
state prison. We deem these activities on [the 
defendant's] part sufficient to put the Government 
and the District Court on notice of the substance 
of his claim. 
Id. at 349-50. 
Similarly, in Henager v. State, 716 P.2d 669 (Okla. Cr. 
1986), th§ defendant filed a request for final disposition and 
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subsequently a Motion to Dismiss for violation of his speedy 
trial rights. The court found that the original request was 
ineffective, but with respect to the Motion to Dismiss, ruled 
that it served as adequate statutory notice to the state, thus 
triggering its IAD responsibilities. Id. at 673. 
Defendant's motion was filed with the District Court and was 
received by the Cache County Attorney. Defendant's follow-up 
correspondence regarding his motion to dismiss was also received 
by the Court and the County Attorney. Accordingly, the Court and 
the State were on notice that the Defendant was requesting speedy 
disposition of all Utah charges. Simply put, Defendant had 
discharged his obligation to file his request for final 
disposition, the only request required of him under the IAD. 
Defendant Brocksmith had, in fact, made repeated speedy trial 
demands for trial to the District Court and to the County 
Attorney that indicted him. He had, therefore, exhausted all 
available State Court remedies for consideration of his speedy 
trial claims. See Gibson at 1058. 
It should be noted that there is no requirement in the 
statute that the elements required under IAD be met in any 
particular order. Thus, even though Defendant filed his request 
for final disposition before a formal detainer was lodged against 
him, once the detainers were lodged and once Brocksmith began 
serving a "term of imprisonment," the State's responsibilities 
under the IAD ripened. 
The sequencing for a prisoner's compliance with Article III 
seems to be as follows: 
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1. The person must have entered "upon a term of 
imprisonment." 
2. There must be pending in the sister state an untried 
indictment, information or complaint. 
3. There must be a detainer lodged by the State against the 
prisoner. 
4. The prisoner must cause a written notice be given to 
both the prosecutor and the court of the jurisdiction which would 
prosecute him. 
5. That request for disposition must notify the prosecutor 
and the Court of his place of imprisonment and accompanied by a 
certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the 
prisoner. 
There is nothing in the Act which requires that the above-
cited sequence must be in the order recited. 
In the case before this Court, the sequence appears as 
follows: 
1. In February or March of 1990, the Cache County Attorney 
received notice of the Defendant's request for disposition dated 
February 7, 1990. Said notice is on file in the District Court 
of Cache County, Utah (File No. 891000111), showing a filing date 
of March 1, 1990. The Cache County Attorney's Office 
acknowledges receipt of the application for disposition on March 
12, 1990, and appeared in District Court on March 26, 1990, but 
failed to disclose to the District Court that it had refiled 
charges against the Defendant in the Circuit Court the previous 
December 21st. 
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2. The County Attorney apparently felt obligated to appear 
in District Court based on the notice received from the chief 
jailer in Mercer County, Illinois, that recognized new charges 
had been filed against Brocksmith by the State of Utah. The 
Cache County Attorney's Office acknowledges receipt of the 
application for disposition on March 12, 1990. 
3. Detainers were filed by the State of Utah in the form of 
a certified felony warrant mailed by Special Agent for the Utah 
Attorney General's Office, Ron E. Miller, on or about April 3, 
1990. That felony warrant was mailed to the Mercer County 
Sheriff in Illinois. A second detainer was filed by the Utah 
Attorney General's Office on August 3, 1990, wherein a certified 
copy of a felony warrant of arrest and a letter to James Fike, 
U.S. Marshal in Springfield, Illinois, was issued. The federal 
marshal received the detainer on August 10, 1990. 
4. The term of imprisonment began on May 13, 1991, when 
Defendant was sentenced on federal charges and incarcerated at 
the Chicago Metro Corrections Center, and was thereafter 
permanently incarcerated at the Sandstone Federal Correctional 
Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota, on June 4, 1991. 
There should be no dispute that the final piece of the 
puzzle to trigger IAD protections began on June 4, 1991. At that 
point, the State had 180 days to bring Mr. Brocksmith to trial. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Brocksmith did not enter his plea of guilty 
until January 14, 1993, the State clearly violated its 
obligations under IAD. 
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On April 3, 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office lodged 
a detainer with the Mercer County Sheriff's Office in Aledo, 
Illinois. By it's own admission, the Mercer County Sheriff's 
Office and the State of Illinois accepted this correspondence 
from the Utah Attorney General as a formal detainer lodged 
against Defendant Brocksmith. (See Record, p. 586. ) On August 
2, 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office lodged a second 
detainer with the Federal Marshal in Springfield, Illinois. This 
detainer was received by the federal authorities on August 10, 
1990. On June 26, 1991, the Cache County Attorney lodged a third 
detainer with the federal authorities at the Sandstone Federal 
Correctional Institution. Thus, at various times--before, after 
and during times when Mr. Brocksmith was incarcerated--the State 
was filing detainers for him to be held. 
The United States Supreme Court in Carchman v. Nash, 473 
U.S. 716, 105 S.C. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985), has defined a 
detainer as follows: 
A detainer is a request filed by a criminal 
justice agency with the institution in which the 
prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution 
either to hold the prisoner or the agency or to 
notify the agency when release of the prisoner is 
imminent. 
Id. at 526. The multiple detainers filed against Brocksmith fit 
squarely within this definition. 
Significantly, in the present case charges were filed on 
December 21, 1989, and an immediate arrest warrant was issued for 
Defendant Brocksmith. Because detainers are based on arrest 
warrants, see Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 221-222 (5th 
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Cir. 1987), and because the charges against Mr. Brocksmith were 
relayed by correctional authorities in Utah to the authorities in 
Illinois, presumably through NCIC, Defendant Brocksmith was 
notified sometime in December 1989 of the charges pending in 
Utah. Because he had been advised of the charges pending in 
Utah, he filed his request for final disposition in February of 
1990. An arrest warrant issued and Utah was on notice that 
Brocksmith had become aware of the Utah charges pending against 
him, and that he wanted them resolved. The State of Utah 
formalized their intent to have a detainer placed on Mr. 
Brocksmith on April 3, 1990. On that day the State sent formal 
notice to the State of Illinois that they wanted Defendant 
Brocksmith held pending the resolution of Illinois charges 
against him. The State cannot now argue that such a request does 
not constitute a detainer. As noted by the Court in U.S. v. 
Schrum, 504 F.Supp. 23 (affirmed, 638 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981), 
prosecutors in receiving jurisdictions should think long and hard 
before filing the detaining requests such as Utah did in April 
1990, in August 1990, and in June 1991. "If a [receiving 
jurisdiction] wishes to avoid raising questions under the act and 
is certain of the prisoner's continued incarceration ... it need 
only refrain from filing a detainer, relying instead upon [a writ 
of habeas corpus]." Id. at 26. In other words, the State of 
Utah should have avoided filing their various detaining requests 
with the State of Illinois if they did not intend to abide by the 
IAD. 
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To be sure, neither the State nor Defendant Brocksmith 
filed, respectively, their detainers or disposition requests in 
the order seemingly contemplated by the act. Interpreting these 
kinds of aberrant factual situations, the courts have generally 
sided with defendants against the state. Citing United States v. 
Hutchins, 489 F.Supp. 710, 714-15 (N.D. Ind. 1980), the Court in 
United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1990), ruled that 
the IAD would be triggered immediately upon the prisoner becoming 
incarcerated, even though the detainer and the request for 
disposition occurred before the term of imprisonment began. Id. 
at 714-15. As astutely noted by the court in Hutchins: "The 
agreement contemplated that ideally the prisoner involved will be 
serving a sentence when his custodian notifies him of a detainer 
and his rights under the agreement. The timing thus 
contemplated, however, is not essential and should not be 
strictly required in a technical fashion when to do so would 
undercut the purposes of the agreement." See Hutchins at 714. 
The court then observed: "Although Article 111(a) mentions the 
above four factors in the order listed [in the statute], there is 
no explicit requirement that they accrue in any special 
sequence." Id. at 714. 
In sum, when Defendant Brocksmith began serving his sentence 
at the Sandstone Correctional Facility on June 4, 1991, all 
requirements of the IAD were met and the State's responsibilities 
thereunder were triggered. The State had 180 days from June 4, 
1991, to bring Defendant Brocksmith to trial. By failing to do 
so, the State violated the clear intent and specific requirement 
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of Article 111(a) of the Act. Defendant Brocksmith has 
previously argued that the Act required the State to perform much 
sooner than June 1991. Indeed, when he made his request for 
final disposition in February 1990, he was already incarcerated, 
albeit as a pretrial detainee. Moreover, when Defendant 
Brocksmith was sentenced in Illinois in July 1990, he was given 
credit for the prior 379 days he had served in the Mercer County 
Jail. An argument could be made that Defendant was serving a 
"term of imprisonment" when both his request for final 
disposition and the State's initial attempt at a detainer were 
filed. But even putting those arguments aside, the very latest 
that all of the IAD requirements converge and trigger the 180-day 
trial clock is June 4, 1991. Accordingly, the State had until 
December 3, 1991 to bring Defendant to trial or suffer the 
consequences spelled out in the Act: "If trial is not had on any 
indictment, information or complaint contemplated [by the act] 
prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of 
imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not 
be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice." (See Article 111(d) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5.) 
When did the State actually bring Brocksmith to trial? On 
January 14, 1993, 583 days after the indisputable entry upon a 
term of imprisonment, June 4, 1991. Utah missed the mark by 403 
days, minus time which could be attributable to Mr. Brocksmith. 
Fundamental fairness in this case requires that the 180-day time 
limit commence running on June 4, 1991, the date on which 
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Brocksmith began serving his sentence in Minnesota. On that 
date, all provisions of the IAD had been complied with: 
Brocksmith was serving a term of imprisonment, a detainer had 
been lodged, Defendant had made requests for final disposition of 
his Utah charges, and the State had received the terms and 
conditions of Defendant's incarceration. As stated in United 
States v. Reed, supra, at page 25, the statute is to be 
"liberally construed to effect rapid disposal of outstanding 
detainers." The Court ruled that "when the government has failed 
to fulfill its obligations under the act, yet the prisoner has 
clearly attempted to get a speedy trial, courts have dismissed 
indictments not prosecuted within 180 days." Simply put, the 
State waited too long to bring Defendant to trial. They cannot 
now be heard to complain that all of the statute's requirements 
were not met or that they did not have sufficient time to bring 
Defendant to trial. Indeed, from February 1990—when Defendant 
made his first request for final disposition—until January 1993-
-when Defendant finally entered his guilty plea in the State of 
Utah--the State of Utah knew of Defendant Brocksmithfs intent to 
have the State abide by the IAD and bring him to trial within 180 
days. Even so, almost three years went by before Defendant was 
brought "to trial." Unquestionably, Defendant's rights under the 
IAD were violated and the State has no standing to bring or 
continue the charges against him. 
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B. The State Violated Article V(e) of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers. 
Article V (e) of IAD requires: "At the earliest practicable 
time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner 
shall be returned to the sending state." 
The State circumvented the purpose and spirit of Article V 
(e) of IAD by failing to transport the Defendant in a timely 
manner after the offer of temporary custody had been provided by 
federal authorities in Minnesota on August 26, 1991. 
Notwithstanding the Defendant had repeatedly raised his request 
for a speedy trial and defended extradition on the basis of 
violation of his speedy trial rights, the State of Utah allowed 
in excess of five months to go by before returning Defendant to 
Utah for trial, violating the purpose and intent of Article IV of 
the IAD. In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court of 
Washington in State v. Peterson, 585 P.2d 66 (Wash. 1978), found 
that while speedy trial time limits do not begin to run until a 
previously "unavailable" defendant is present within the 
jurisdiction, the state must make a diligent effort to return a 
defendant to the prosecuting state for trial: 
Finally, under 3.3(f) the speedy trial time limits 
applicable to a defendant who is absent and 
thereby unavailable for trial do not run until the 
defendant is actually present. However, 
unavailability as established under this rule can 
be shown only if the prosecution demonstrates good 
faith and diligent efforts to obtain the 
availability of the defendant. ... We agree with 
that portion of State v. Hattori, 573 P.2d 829 
(Wash. 1978), wherein the Court of Appeals states: 
A defendant cannot be considered 'unavailable' for 
purposes of Section 3.3(f), if his whereabouts are 
known and reasonable efforts are not taken to 
obtain his presence in the county wherein the 
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charges are pending. If the state fails to 
exercise reasonable efforts in obtaining the 
defendant's presence, the time periods shall not 
accrue anew within the meaning of TSection] 
3.3(f). In determining whether the state has 
acted reasonably, the time necessary for 
transporting the defendant back to this state and 
administrative delays caused by the foreign 
jurisdiction as well as whether the defendant 
waives extradition, are important factors to be 
considered. 
Id. at 69 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, Utah authorities were well aware of 
Brocksmith's location and had been aware during the entire 
pendency of the Illinois charges. Further, there were no 
administrative delays in the sending jurisdiction which would 
have prevented Defendant's return. The State of Illinois offered 
temporary custody of the Defendant on August 26, 1991. 
Thereafter, the State allowed 176 days to expire before even 
bringing the Defendant to Utah. On this basis alone, as 
expressed in Peterson, the delay in bringing Defendant Brocksmith 
to Utah itself should be sufficient to require dismissal of the 
charges against him. 
C. The State Violated the 120-Day Speedy Trial Provision 
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. 
Article IV (a) of the IAD provides: 
The appropriate officer ... shall be entitled to 
have a prisoner ... made available ... upon 
presentation of a written request for temporary 
custody ..•; 
In respect to any proceedings made possible by 
this article, trial shall be commenced within one 
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner 
in the receiving state ... . (c) 
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Not only did the State wait 176 days before even bringing 
Defendant Brocksmith to Utah, once they got him here on February 
19, 1992, the State then waited almost an entire year before 
bringing Defendant Brocksmith to trial. Under the IAD, the State 
has 120 days from the time a defendant arrives in the receiving 
jurisdiction to bring that defendant to trial. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-5 (IV)(c). As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985), this 120-day time 
limitation is the legislatively expressed time limit for a 
constitutionally speedy trial in cases involving the IAD: 
[Under Article VI(a) of the Act] the running of 
[these] time periods shall be tolled whenever and 
for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand 
trial, as determined by the court. 
Id. at 1176. The determinative phrase in this section is "unable 
to stand trial." As noted by the Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. 
Birdwell, 983 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1993), "we decline to expand 
[this] phrase to encompass legal inability due to the filing of 
motions or requests." Id. at 1340-41. Thus, the Birdwell court 
ruled that where a continuance was not granted or moved for by 
either party, and neither could say a postponement was necessary, 
the charges should have been dismissed. And, while the Birdwell 
court noted that if a state objected to or was unprepared to 
respond to a defense motion, the trial court, sua sponte, or on 
the motion of the prosecution could grant a reasonable 
continuance, that such a continuance must be granted in open 
court with the defendant or his counsel present. Then, and only 
then, will the 120-day period be tolled. See also U.S. v. Roy. 
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830 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1987) (good cause must be shown in open 
court in order to insure that the delay does not work to the 
detriment of the substantial rights of the prisoner). Id. at 
634. 
There was no "open court" good cause for a delay shown here, 
other than Defendant Brocksmith?s own demand for an immediate 
arraignment and trial setting on May 2, 1992. On that same day, 
the State made its own demand for trial within the 120-day time 
limit, acknowledging that the 120 days were about to run. The 
State further admitted that despite some pretrial motions by Mr. 
Brocksmith, it was ready to proceed to trial. Mr. Brocksmith did 
file a motion to dismiss the charges against him after he was 
finally brought back to Utah in the spring of 1992. But this did 
not delay the State nor cause them to be unable to proceed to 
trial. Thus, without requesting a continuance, or being granted 
one, the State's 120-day time limit to bring Defendant Brocksmith 
to trial began running no later than February 19, 1992 (the day 
he arrived in Utah), and ended on June 21, 1992. As 
authoritatively stated by the Utah Supreme Court in an analogous 
situation in State v. Shaw, 651 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982): 
When the trial court has not been asked to 
exercise the authority granted to it by the 
agreement for extending the time to bring the 
matter to trial, we find nothing in the agreement 
or in logic which would give us the authority to 
do so. 
The district attorney may not have willfully 
caused any delay in trying defendant, but as the 
Klimec court noted, at 206 A.2d 382, that is not a 
controlling issue nor is it a valid excuse for not 
complying with the statute. 
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We find no merit in any philosophy that pays lip 
service to the principles of due process, speedy 
trial, and binding interstate compacts ... and 
then ignores those principles because their 
benefits were called upon by the very person whose 
interests were intended to be protected by them. 
Id. at 120. 
The State waited almost three years from the time of 
Defendant's first request for final disposition of the charges 
against him to bring him to trial, a period which included almost 
a one year wait after Defendant Brocksmith was finally back 
within the jurisdiction. This unconscionable delay is the very 
punishment that IAD was meant to prevent. The Act gives very 
little discretion to the trial court in this matter. Indeed, 
given the unquestioned delay of trial, the court had a duty to 
dismiss the charges against Defendant Brocksmith with prejudice. 
"If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint 
contemplated [in the act] prior to the prisoner's being returned 
to the original place of imprisonment ..., such indictment, 
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or 
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same 
with prejudice." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5, Article IV(e) 
(emphasis added). 
II 
THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW PLEA BASED ON DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A 
SPEEDY TRIAL UNDER SECTIONS 7 AND 24 OF ARTICLE I 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENT 4 OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Section 77-1-6 of the Utah Code Annotated states that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to be tried within 30 days of his 
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arraignment if the business of the court permits. Although this 
section is directory in nature, the Utah Court of Appeals, in 
State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991), has confirmed that 
it provides guidelines for consideration of speedy trial issues: 
However, Section 77-1-6 is directory in nature, 
not mandatory ... . Nonetheless, a period of time 
between arrest and trial in excess of the 
statutory directive may well be a "triggering 
mechanism" for heightened scrutiny of a claim that 
the right to speedy trial was denied. 
Id. at 207. 
Heightened scrutiny requires that the Court consider factors 
such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, 
Defendant's assertions of his rights, and the prejudice to the 
Defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 
2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In this case, defendant was first 
held to answer in October 1989. Thereafter, the state obtained 
an ex parte dismissal of the charges on November 6, 1989, and 
then refiled those charges on December 21, 1989. Excluding the 
time between the latter two dates, over four years expired from 
when Defendant was first held to answer for these charges and the 
final disposition in January of 1993. Although the State may 
argue that this time period is not presumptively 
unconstitutional, it certainly demands inquiry into the Barker 
factors described above. 
Under Barker, the Court must consider the reasons for the 
delay. In this case, there are several factors which contributed 
to the delay. Initially, the State refused to bring Defendant 
Brocksmith to trial on the first set of charges, notwithstanding 
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Defendant's desire to remain in Utah and face charges here. 
Shortly after Defendant was transferred to Illinois to face 
charges there, the State again filed charges against the 
Defendant. The State took no action to bring the Defendant to 
trial while he was facing Illinois state and federal charges. 
Nor did the State apply to the court for an extension of time in 
which to prosecute based upon the fact that the Defendant was on 
trial elsewhere. However, even excluding the time Defendant was 
facing state and federal charges in Illinois, the State failed to 
transport the Defendant to Utah for more than nine months after 
he was sentenced on federal charges in May 1991. Only 30 days of 
that time is attributable to Defendant and was based upon 
Defendant's understanding that his right to speed trial had 
already been violated. 
Speedy trial time limits apply as much to prisoners 
incarcerated elsewhere as to those who are not. See State v. 
Peterson, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). Clearly, after August 26, 
1991, there were no obstacles created by the Defendant or 
otherwise which would have prevented the State from bringing the 
Defendant before the court in Utah. Accordingly, the nearly 18 
months that it took the State to bring Defendant to trial are 
previously attributable to the State. 
Under Barker, the Court must next consider whether the 
Defendant asserted his right to speedy trial. The Defendant 
first requested a speedy disposition of the Utah charges against 
him in his memorandum to the District Judge dated November 5, 
1989. That memorandum was received by the Court after the 
-29-
Defendant had been transported to Illinois. However, it was 
filed in the District Court file and indicated Defendant's desire 
to obtain speedy disposition of Utah charges. Defendant then 
reiterated his request for speedy trial on February 7, 1990, 
March 15, 1991, April 15, 1991, April 26, 1991, and in his 
federal habeas corpus petition. There can be no doubt that 
Defendant made his request for speedy trial known. 
It should also be noted that the State chose to request a 
dismissal of charges against the Defendant in November 1989 
rather than afford Defendant a speedy trial at that time. This 
was based upon the fact that Defendant had chosen to plead not 
guilty to the charges. However, the State refiled charges 
against the Defendant only 45 days after obtaining a dismissal of 
the first set of charges, indicating that the State was prepared 
to go to trial at that time. The only change in the second 
information was to increase the degree of the communications 
fraud charges to first degree felonies and reduce their number to 
four. Based on these facts, it is reasonable to assume that the 
State could have proceeded to trial in December of 1989 and 
afforded the Defendant a speedy trial at that time. 
Contrary to the State's representations, the Defendant was 
not informed of the State's decision to seek a dismissal of the 
charges. Had he been so informed, he would have objected. He 
had no opportunity to raise this issue as he was incarcerated and 
not brought before the Court for this hearing. A defendant is 
entitled to be present at all stages of the proceedings against 
him. State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1935). Further, as 
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stated in People v. Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d 70, 72 (Colo. 1981), 
the Court should consider the interests of the Defendant and 
society when entertaining a motion to dismiss: 
This provision parallels Federal Rule Crim. P. 48 
(a) ... It is intended to give the court some 
supervisory power over the prosecution of a case 
so that the interests of justice, as well as the 
interest of the defendant and society, can be 
effected. 
In addition, the reasons for a dismissal must be set forth 
in the order so that "... all might know what invoked the court's 
discretion and whether its action was justified." Salt Lake City 
v. Hanson, 425 P.2d 773 (Utah 1967). In the instant case, the 
order states that it is based on the State's motion, but does not 
contain the specific basis for the dismissal. 
Although the State represented that Defendant's attorney did 
not object to dismissal of the charges, Brocksmith was not aware 
of that fact and Brocksmith's attorney denies receiving a copy of 
the Motion to Dismiss. This factor should be carefully 
considered in weighing whether Defendant's rights were violated. 
Lastly, and contrary to cases under the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers, the Court must consider whether the Defendant was 
prejudiced by the delay. In Barker, prejudice included pretrial 
incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and impairment 
of defense. Certainly Defendant has experienced concern and 
anxiety over the status of his case in Utah, as evidenced by his 
continual requests for final disposition of his case, and his 
federal habeas corpus action. Brocksmith was unable to preserve 
and prepare his defense on Utah charges as he had been 
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and prepare his defense on Utah charges as he had been 
transferred to Illinois and did not have local counsel appointed 
who could have investigated factual issues surrounding his case 
which were related to his defense and were of concern to the Mr. 
Brocksmith. Had he been brought to trial prior to being 
transferred to Illinois, as was his desire, he would have had 
access to fresh evidence and current recollections by defense 
witnesses and his defense would not have been impaired. 
Defendant became subject to the possibility of consecutive 
sentencing, based upon his intervening conviction on federal 
charges--certainly an issue of high anxiety. 
The State delayed in prosecuting these charges, the 
Defendant repeatedly requested speedy disposition of the charges, 
Defendant was not brought into the jurisdiction of this Court 
until over nine months after his sentencing on federal charges. 
Only 30 days of that time was attributable to the Defendant and 
Defendant was unable to obtain local counsel to assist him in 
preparing and preserving his defense. Accordingly, all the 
factors in Barker weigh in favor of the Defendant and the charges 
against him should be dismissed with prejudice. 
Ill 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS BY THE FAILURE OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH TO FOLLOW ITS OWN LAW AND PROCEDURES, 
INCLUDING A DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURT. 
It is axiomatic that the State must treat all citizens alike 
in its trial procedures. The United States Supreme Court has 
said: 
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But no state is at liberty to impose upon one 
charged with crime a discrimination in its trial 
procedure which the constitution, and an act of 
congress passed pursuant to the constitution, 
alike forbid. Nor is this court to grant or 
withhold the benefits of equal protection, which 
the constitution commands for all, merely as we 
may deem the defendant innocent or guilty. 
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 2 L.Ed.2d 991, 78 S.Ct. 970. 
The State has committed multiple errors in not following its 
own procedure. Mr. Brocksmith was arrested on July 13, 1989. 
Contrary to the mandate of the United State Supreme Court as 
stated in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661, no 
probable cause statement was filed. Thereafter, Defendant 
entered a plea of not guilty on October 19, 1989, and even though 
he was in custody, no trial date was fixed within 30 days as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(h) (1953). The Code 
requires: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant 
is entitled: ... (h) to be admitted to bail in 
accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled 
to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if 
unable to post bail and if the business of the 
court permits. 
While it is true that subsection (l)(h) is directory in 
nature and not mandatory (State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)), yet when the defendant remains in custody, the 
obligation of the State increases proportionate to the length of 
time that incarceration continues. 
Subsection (l)(a) likewise entitles the Defendant "... to 
appear in person and defend in person or by counsel." This right 
was also denied to Mr. Brocksmith when he was not permitted to be 
present when the court dismissed the first information on 
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November 6, 1989, nor when the court considered his claim for 
immediate disposition of charges against him on March 26, 1990. 
Arguably this constitutes a violation of Article I, Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires 
that the court must state the reasons for entering a dismissal of 
charges and enter the same in the minutes. This was not done on 
November 6, 1989. Defendant further is entitled to receive a 
copy of the accusation filed against him, but when the 
information was refiled on December 21, 1989, no copy of said 
information was sent to Mr. Brocksmith nor had he been furnished 
a copy of the information more than two years and two months 
later. This violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(1)(b). 
One of the more critical violations by the State deals with 
a defendantf s rights as an indigent person to be assigned 
counsel: 
Counsel shall be assigned to represent each 
indigent person who is under arrest for or charged 
with a crime in which there is a substantial 
probability that the penalty to be imposed is 
confinement in either jail or prison if: 
(a) The defendant requests it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2(1)(a) (1953). The Court has previously 
observed that this section is nothing more than a codification of 
the constitutional rights to assistance of counsel and self-
representation as enunciated in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1988), affirmed 776 P.2d 631 (1989). 
In this instance, Defendant requested counsel be appointed 
for him on three separate occasions. These requests occurred on 
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June 5, 1990, March 16, 1991, and April 30, 1991, and can be 
found or are referenced in the Court's own record on pages 183 
and 165. 
When the County Attorney moved ex parte to dismiss the first 
information against Mr. Brocksmith on November 6, 1989, he waited 
only 45 days to refile in the Circuit Court a new information 
alleging virtually the same offenses but increasing the severity 
of charges. The District Court was unaware that new charges had 
been filed in the Circuit Court and was therefore not disposed to 
act upon the ongoing motions and requests by Mr. Brocksmith. The 
silence by the County Attorney's Office prevented the District 
Court from fairly conveying the request for disposition made by 
Mr. Brocksmith to the appropriate court or responding to his 
request for counsel or to his request for a speedy trial. Such 
silence by the County Attorney's Office should not become a basis 
for an inappropriate circumventing of Mr. Brocksmith's 
constitutional rights. 
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have 
variously been applied to criminal matters. State v. Irwin, 101 
Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285. On March 26, 1990, the District Court 
for the First Judicial District determined that the information 
filed in this case was dismissed and shall remain dismissed. On 
September 24, 1991, the United States District Court for the 
State of Utah found as a fact that: "... there are no charges 
pending against petitioner in the Utah courts at this time." 
This finding was based on the Utah District Court's finding on 
March 26, 1990, even though the District Court mistakenly 
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referred to the date of March 15, 1990. Mr. C. C. Horton, the 
same Deputy Attorney General for Utah who had filed the 
information in the Logan Circuit Court on December 21, 1989, was 
a party defendant to the action in the United States District 
Court. The State of Utah was likewise a party to the proceeding 
in the District Court in Cache County. Despite the State 
obviously being aware of the refiled charges, at no time did 
either the County Attorney's Office or any Utah Assistant 
Attorney disclose to either State or Federal District Court the 
true state of affairs regarding the refiled charges. Their 
collective conspiracy of silence created confusion for the two 
courts looking at the matter, and should not become a basis of 
reward given for the State's conduct. This information of the 
refiled charges, which was withheld from the courts, was directly 
contrary to the knowledge of the prosecutor who themselves had 
refiled the charges. Why no disclosure was made by the State's 
officers has not yet been made known to either the courts or the 
Defendant. 
Inasmuch as the parties were identical in both instances, 
the issues having been contested by the Defendant and the courts 
in both cases having found that no information had in fact been 
filed in either court, res judicata and collateral estoppel 
arguably should have required dismissal of the charges with 
prejudice. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The State of Utah breached its obligation to Mr. Brocksmith 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5, Articles 3, 4, and 5. Moreover, 
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United States Constitutions were violated by delays occasioned by 
the State. Multiple violations of equal protection and due 
process, coupled with the previous problems described herein, 
require the Court to remand the matter to the District Court for 
withdrawal of the guilty plea previously entered with 
instructions to thereafter dismiss the charges with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this |S"~^  day of April, 1994. 
v^ .a y-<-
HERM OLSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT JACK BROCKSMITH'S BRIEF was deposited in the 
United States mail to Joanne Slotnik, Assistant Attorney General, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this (S^^ 
day of April, 1994. 
Herm 01sen 
i=s_ 
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General ., ,r 
C. C. HORTON II - 1542 PEB if 3 07 in 'Sci 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
GARY O. McKEAN - 2201 
Cache County Attorney 
Attorney for the State of Utah 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-8920 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, ] 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
) LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
I MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA 
I District Court No: 921000051 
I (Circuit Court No: 891001462) 
This matter came before the Court upon the Defendant's pro se 
motion to withdraw plea. The matter was considered by the Court ex 
parte, at the request of the State, and having reviewed both the 
motion, the State's response to that motion, and the Court's file, 
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FEB
 1 0 I99J 
EXHIBIT " ^ * (Page 2 of 4 pages) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that: 
1. There was no condition of the plea negotiation nor any 
provision of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment entered in this 
matter that imposed any specific deadline on the State for the 
transfer of the Defendant from the custody of the Cache County Jail 
to federal authorities, nor for the transportation of the Defendant 
to the Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution. 
2. Defendant fails to show good cause for the withdrawal of 
his plea as required by §77-13-6(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended• 
3. Defendant's motion improperly raises issues regarding 
allegations of violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
and his right to a speedy trial. Those matters had previously been 
appropriately and lawfully considered by this Court, and the 
Defense motions with respect to those issues were lawfully denied. 
4. The Defendant, in fact, was transferred from the Cache 
County Jail to federal authorities, and transported in the custody 
of the Federal Authorities, on February 5, 1993, four (4) days 
before the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was actually filed, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea is inadequate and 
fails to meet the criteria required by §77-13-6(2) (a), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
M8/ 
EXHIBIT * ^  (page 3 of 4 pages) 
2. Because of the Defendant's transfer and transportation 
from the Cache County Jail prior to the filing of his motion, the 
motion is moot. 
3. The Defendant fails to state any basis upon which the 
relief requested may be granted, and therefore the Motion to 
Withdraw should be denied. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court has considered the matter ex parte, at the request 
of the State, including a review of the Defendant's motion, the 
State's response to that motion, and the Court's file. 
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw Plea is hereby denied. ^ ^ 
DATED this / xfay of F^bfuary; 1993. 
' W BY THE COURT: 
GORDON J. LOV^ 
District Judge 
a 
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EXHIBIT " ^ " (Page 4 of 4 pages) 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was delivered this date to Arden 
Lauritzen, Co-Counsel for Defendant, Barbara King Lachmar, Co-
Counsel for Defendant, at their respective mailboxes at the 
District Court. 
DATED this //^ day of February, 1993. 
Legal Assistant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea to Jack Brocksmith, Defendant, 
at Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution, Sandstone, MN 
55072. 
DATED this //* day of February, 1993. 
Ofl^ 
EXHIBIT " ^ »
 (page i 0f 3 oaaes) 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 921000051 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE the Court upon the Defendant's Motion 
for Leave to Withdraw his plea. The Motion is supported by an 
Affidavit received the 26th day of February 19-93. The Court 
having reviewed the pleadings in this matter, together with the 
Affidavit, being cognizant of the circumstance surrounding the 
entry of the plea and being aware of the plea negotiation, it 
would appear that the State did act expeditiously in .this 
matter, that the Defendant was turned over to the federal 
authorities in a timely fashion, that transportation was 
provided by said federal authorities and was out of the hands 
and control of the State. No appropriate relief could be 
provided by granting the Motion. For the above reason and 
those stated in the State's Response the Motion is denied. 
q&& 
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EXHIBIT " 3 " (page 2 of 3 pages) 
S t a t e v s . Brocksmith 
#921000051 
Page 2 
Counsel for the State is directed, to prepare a formal Order 
in conformance herewith. 
Dated this cPf d a y o f M a r c h / 1993-
BY THE COURT 
Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
EXHIBIT "<3 * (page 3 of 3 pages) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTACHED NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID, 
TO THE FOLLOWING: 
GARY 0. MCKEAN 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
110 NORTH 100 WEST 
LOGAN UT 84321 
BARBARA LACHMAR 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
POST OFFICE BOX 4432 
LOGAN UT 84321 
DATED THIS DAY OF 19 SI 
..MjyQ B. DANKS 
Deputy Clerk 
ARDEN LAURITZEN 
610 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P0 BOX 171 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
EXHIBIT H^m (P a g e 1 o f 4 pages) 
IN THE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY-
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK D. BROCKSMITH, 
Defendant , 
STATE OF UTAHi 
Plaintiff• 
District Court No. 921000051 
(Circuit Court No* #91001462) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
NOW COMES Defendant, Jack D. Brocksmith, in pro 
se, and appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
and/or the Utah Court of Appeals from the Judgment Order 
entered January 14, 1993* 
This is not a Notice of Appeal regarding the De-
fendant's Motion to Withdraw His Plea Bargain. 
It is in fact an appeal that addresses itself to 
the more fundamental question of jurisdiction* The Court 
will recall that this issue was raised by the Defendant in 
his pro se Motion to Dismiss, filed in March, 1990* It was 
raised again by his court-appointed counsel in February, 
1992, and denied on October 5, 1992. 
Through his court-appointed counsel, Defendant 
petitioned the Supreme Court with an interlocutory appeal* 
The Supreme Court refused to hear this Motion. 
MAR 0 4 1993 
GOT) 
EXHIBIT "V~tf (P a^ e 2 of 4 pages) 
In a narrow set of circumstances, immediate 
appeal of a pretrial judgment is available. The Supreme 
Court articulated an exception to the final judgment rule 
as follows: 
11
 Finally determining claims of right 
separable from, and collateral to* 
rights asserted in the action, too 
important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to re-
quire that appellate consideration be 
deferred until the whole case is ad-
judicated* fl (gotten y Beneficial In-
dustrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) 
In a criminal case* "The collateral order doctrine" 
allows appeal from a judgment that: (l) Conclusively de-
termines the disputed issue; (2) Is completely separate 
from the issue of the defendants guilt; and (3) Is ef-
fectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment•" 
(Abney v United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-63 [1977]) 
The Supreme Courtfs option not to act on Defendants 
interlocutory appeal should not hamper its duty to hear it 
now The right of speedy trial is a constitutional issue 
that is fundamental to the ends of justice. 
The Defendant was asking with his Motion to dis-
miss in 1990; the more formal motion filed in February 1992 asked 
that the First District Court make legal precedent. This 
clearly first impression case has merit for not only this 
Defendant, but for Utah case law that is nearly silent on 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The First District 
Court may have no mandate to create law, but the Appeals 
Court of Utah does have not only that commission, but that 
responsibility. 
~ 2 - rf± £1 fi 
EXHIBIT "^" (page 3 of 4 pages) 
In November 1991 Defendant did file a 42 U.S.C. 
19#3 Action in the United States District Court, Case 91-
C-1245W, regarding his constitutional rights as to search 
and seizure and speedy trial as interpreted by present 
Utah law. This case is still pending. 
His guilty plea of January 14, 199J, not with-
standing his waiver of his nonjurisdictional constitutional 
rights must be understood in its proper context. He had 
been in the Cache County Jail for nearly a year. He was 
facing a potential five to life sentence for communica-
tion fraud - a law that is,to say the least, constitionally 
vague. What he was in reality guilty of was misappropria-
tion, but no such criminal law exists in the state of Utah. 
The state was going to recommend consecutive sentencing on 
the charges. The Defendant is fifty-four years of age, and 
his health is failing. After conferring with his children, 
he did what any reasonable person would do. 
This appeal is not to refute the plea agreement, 
but whether or not the First District Court as mandated by 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the Sixth Amend-
ment was in fact without jurisdiction* A constitutional 
issue of such magnitude deserves the review of a higher 
court, and should not be considered a violation of the 
plea agreement. 
Conclusion 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this Honorable Court 
will grant an appeal of this case, appoint counsel to pre-
~
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EXHI3IT (page 4 of 4 pages) 
pare Defendant's appeal, and such other relief as this 
Court deems just and proper. 
T a 
Dated this 
day 
of P-C& 1993 
Respectfully submitted, 
D".z Brocksmith 
-026-B 
Jox 1000 
Sandstone MN 55072 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this date, I, the undersigned, do hereby 
s'-rear and affirm under penalty of perjury that I did 
deposit in the United States mail receptacle at the 
Federal Correctional Institution, Sandstone, Minnesota, 
with sufficient first class postage, a true and correct 
copy of NOTICE OF APPEAL, addressed to: Gary 0. McKean, 
Cache County Attorney, Attorney for the State of Utah, 
110 North 100 West, Logan, Utah 84321; and to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, UtaJi 84114. 
Dated t h i s ?£ 
-H 
of 
.
 d a y 
1993 
8773-026-B 
'0 Box 1000 
andstone MN 55072 
